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Abstract:
We examine the impact of family control on the likelihood of accounting misstatements
and on market reactions to subsequent restatements. Using a matched-firm approach, we find
that family control overall reduces the incidence of misstatements, consistent with the notion
that controlling families have a greater concern for reputation than nonfamily blockholders.
However, compared to nonfamily firm restatements, restatements announced by familycontrolled firms trigger significantly more negative market reactions. We attribute the more
negative market reactions to the greater loss in reputation and higher investor scepticism of
the credibility of corporate insiders for family firms than for nonfamily firms following
restatements.
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1. Introduction
High-quality accounting information plays a central role in designing the mechanisms
that mitigate various agency conflicts among blockholders, managers, and outside investors
(Bushman & Smith, 2001; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Armstrong, Guay, & Weber, 2010).
Because of the prevalence of family firms across the globe, a growing number of studies
examine the association between family ownership/control and the quality of accounting
information (e.g., Wang, 2006; Chen, Chen, & Cheng, 2008; Cascino, Pugliese, Mussolino,
& Sansone, 2010; Chen, Chen, & Cheng, 2014). The evidence from existing studies is,
however, inconclusive. Moreover, little is known about whether and how family control
influences the way investors react to changes in accounting information quality.
In this study we build on prior literature to examine the impact of family control on
accounting restatements. 1 Specifically, we aim to answer two related questions. Does family
control reduce or increase the likelihood of a firm misstating its accounting statement? Do
investors react differently to restatements announced by family-controlled firms and those by
nonfamily-controlled firms? 2 We focus on accounting restatements not only because the
unprecedented number of accounting restatements have caused great concern among
regulators and other market participants, but also because restatement is one of the most
visible forms of low-quality accounting information (Cao, Myers, & Omer, 2012) and there is
1

Throughout this paper, we use the term 'family firms (nonfamily firms)' or 'family-controlled firms (nonfamily-

controlled firms)' interchangeably, because our definition of family firms requires that the founding family
exercises effective control of the firm (see Section 3.3.1 for more details).
2

Because prior literature finds significant differences in market reactions between restatements of a material and

immaterial nature and between restatements initiated by different parties (e.g, Palmrose, Richard, & Scholz,
2004; Hennes et al., 2008; Firth, Rui, & Wu, 2011; Cao et al., 2012), in this paper we focus on mandatory
material restatements to avoid unnecessary complexity. However, future research to further examine the
possible different impacts of family control on these different types of restatements will be interesting.
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no need for researchers to use a model to identify low-quality firms (Dechow, Ge, & Schrand,
2010).
The link between family control and the likelihood of accounting restatements is well
supported by economic theory and existing literature. The multi-generation nature of
controlling families' ownership suggests that they have greater concern for reputation than
nonfamily blockholders (Gilson, 2007; Chen et al., 2008). This will deter family-controlled
firms from misstating their financial statements not only because subsequent restatements
often cause substantial reputational penalties (Karpoff, Lee, & Martin, 2008; Murphy,
Shrieves, & Tibbs, 2009), but also because family owners may lose certain other
nonpecuniary benefits, such as high social status and political connections, which are
reputation-based. In addition, restatements are often associated with a wide range of negative
consequences (e.g., Palmrose, Richardson, & Scholz, 2004; Hribar & Jenkins, 2004; Graham,
Li, & Qiu, 2008; Firth, Rui, & Wu, 2011). Family owners' concentrated and underdiversified
equity ownership means that they will bear a significant proportion of economic losses
resulting from mandatory restatements, which further reduces family owners’ incentive for
misreporting.
In summary, controlling families' greater concern for reputation, high equity ownership,
and their dominant positions and better monitoring of managers, indicate that they have more
incentives, as well as the capacity, to provide high-quality accounting information, leading to
a negative relationship between family control and the likelihood of misstatements.
We next explore whether investor reactions to subsequent restatements differ between
family-controlled firms and nonfamily-controlled firms. Family-controlled firms are
characterized by potentially more severe agency conflicts between the controlling shareholder
and minority shareholders, suggesting that investors have a greater demand for high-quality
accounting information for family-controlled firms and consequently are more sensitive to
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the deterioration in the quality of accounting information in family-controlled firms than in
nonfamily-controlled firms. Restatements provide new information that leads outside
investors not only to lower their expectation about the quality of accounting information, but
also to increase their concerns about management's opportunistic decision making, with both
effects likely to have more negative consequences for family firms than for nonfamily firms.
Therefore, investors are likely to react more negatively to restatements announced by familycontrolled firms than to those by nonfamily-controlled firms.
In addition, accounting restatements reveal that the design and / or the implementation of
corporate governance is relatively weak, deepening investors' concerns about possible
expropriation by controlling shareholders, which is perceived to be more severe in familycontrolled firms than in nonfamily-controlled firms. Finally, the literature finds that the media
is more likely to publicize targets or events about which there is a higher demand for
information or with high prominence (e.g., Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Dyck & Zingales,
2003). This suggests that restatements announced by family-controlled firms are likely to
attract more media attention, which further enhances the more negative market reactions to
family firm restatement announcements. Combining the above analysis, we predict that
investors' greater concerns about controlling families’ opportunistic behaviour and the
unfavourable media coverage are likely to trigger more negative market reactions to
restatements announced by family-controlled firms than those announced by nonfamilycontrolled firms.
We test our hypotheses using a sample of 151 accounting restatements announced by
Chinese public firms in the period 2004 to 2010. The majority of the restatement literature
focuses on the US market. The US has one of the most widely dispersed ownership structures
and most favourable institutional environments, which suggests that both the causes and the
consequences of accounting restatements are likely to differ significantly between the US and
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many other countries (Coffee, 2005). China is characterized by a weak legal environment,
underdeveloped but fast-growing financial markets, and a highly concentrated ownership
structure, making China a good representative of many emerging markets. Another salient
feature and advantage of Chinese data is that the vast majority of listed firms in China have a
dominant controlling shareholder with a high ownership stake. This allows us to implicitly
control for ownership concentration, giving us greater confidence to conclude that our
findings are truly attributable to the nature of family control rather than to ownership
concentration itself.
Using a matched-firm approach, we find that, compared to nonfamily-controlled firms,
family-controlled firms in China are significantly less likely to misstate their annual financial
statements, even after controlling for firm characteristics and other corporate governance
proxies that are found to be associated with accounting misstatements in prior studies. This
finding is consistent with the notion that controlling families have a greater concern for
reputation as well as the overall evidence that family owners have greater incentives to
mitigate agency costs than nonfamily blockholders (e.g., Wang, 2006; Chen et al., 2008;
Chen et al., 2014).
With respect to investor reactions to accounting restatements, we find that family control
is associated with significantly stronger market reactions, specifically more negative
cumulative abnormal return (CAR), higher abnormal return variance (ARV), higher abnormal
trading volume (ATV), and higher abnormal bid-ask spread (ABAS), over short windows
surrounding the restatement announcement. The stronger negative reactions to family firm
restatements are even more pronounced when the risk of expropriation by the controlling
shareholder is higher. We also find that family restatement firms experience a significantly
larger loss in the information content of earnings measured by the earnings response
coefficient (ERC) compared to nonfamily restatement firms.

5

This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we establish a direct link
between family control and market reactions to accounting restatements. In this regard, our
study complements an important body of literature that tries to identify the determinants of
market reactions to restatements. For example, more negative stock returns are found to be
associated with restatements that involve frauds (Palmrose et al., 2004), core accounts
(Palmrose & Scholz, 2004; Agrawal & Chadha, 2005), less accounting complexity (Peterson,
2012), and restatements that reduce earnings (Palmrose et al., 2004; Callen, Robb, & Segal,
2008). This study generates direct evidence that the identity of controlling shareholders, in
this case founding families, can also influence market reactions to accounting restatements.
Specifically, our results show that investors are more sensitive to the deterioration in
accounting information quality, as proxied by accounting restatements, in family-controlled
firms than in nonfamily-controlled firms; consequently they react more negatively to family
firm restatements than to nonfamily firm restatements. Existing evidence on the impact of
family control on market reactions to restatements is scarce.
Second, the existing literature on family firms commonly relies on the assumption that
family firms have a greater concern for reputation than nonfamily firms because, compared to
nonfamily blockholders, family owners usually have a longer investment horizon, a greater
equity ownership, a larger proportion of their wealth tied to the success of the firms, and
greater nonpecuniary benefits. However, there is little direct empirical evidence that family
control leads to greater corporate reputation. We build on prior literature to address an
important but largely ignored question, 'What are the implications or consequences when the
reputation of controlling families is impaired?' The stronger and more negative reactions and
the larger drop in ERC following accounting restatements by family firms indicate more
severe consequences once investors' higher expectations about family firms’ concern for
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reputation is violated. Our results thus provide indirect empirical evidence that family firms
do have greater incentives to build and maintain a good reputation.
To some extent, our findings are consistent with those in Kouwenberg and Phunnarungsi
(2013), who find larger negative market reaction to announcements of violations of rules and
regulations when firms with low past violation records (i.e., good reputation) violate the rules.
In this regard, our study also provides empirical support to the expectancy violation theory
(Burgoon & LePoire, 1993; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006).
Third, this study enhances our understanding of the impact of family control/ownership
on accounting information quality, especially for emerging markets. Fan and Wong (2002)
find that concentrated ownership in East Asia is associated with less informative earnings.
Our study in contrast suggests a negative relationship between family control and the
likelihood of accounting misstatements (i.e., higher earnings quality). We offer two possible
explanations for the seemingly contradictory results. First, Fan and Wong (2002) examine the
impact of ownership concentration, while we focus on the impact of family control. As we
argue throughout this paper, the incentives and the impact of controlling families are different
from those of nonfamily blockholders. The unique feature of Chinese data allows us to
attribute our findings to the nature of family control rather than to ownership concentration
itself. Second, for firms listed in the Chinese markets where a large number of firms have
relatively low-quality information, providing low-quality earnings (e.g., large discretionary
accruals or less timely loss recognition) does not necessarily impair a firm's (and ultimately
the controlling shareholder's) reputation. In contrast, accounting misstatements and
subsequent restatements are much more serious than other forms of low-quality information
and therefore are more likely a reputation-impairing event. The analysis and our empirical
evidence thus suggest that a positive association between family ownership/control and
information opacity (or other forms of low-quality accounting information) do not necessarily
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imply a positive association between family ownership/control and the likelihood of
accounting misstatements.
We note that the relationship between family firms and accounting restatements has been
addressed by several papers, such as Agrawal and Chadha (2005) and Tong (2007), both
using US data. While Agrawal and Chadha (2005) find that a firm is more likely to restate its
earnings if the CEO belongs to the founding family, Tong (2007) finds a lower probability of
restatements among family firms than nonfamily firms. Apart from using Chinese data
instead of US data, our paper differs from these two papers in one important aspect. Neither
Agrawal and Chadha (2005) nor Tong (2007) distinguish between voluntary restatements and
mandatory (or forced) restatements. As Srinivasan, Wahid, and Yu (2015) point out, a lower
rate of voluntary restatements could possibly indicate a lack of detection and disclosure of
accounting errors and irregularities and thus a lower earnings quality. The exclusion of
voluntary restatements from our study gives us relatively high confidence to conclude that the
lower incidence of mandatory restatements among family firms does suggest that family
firms have a higher reporting quality than nonfamily firms.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature and
presents our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our research design and sample. Section 4
reports our main empirical results. Section 5 carries out some robustness tests. Finally,
Section 6 concludes.

2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
2.1 Family Control and Accounting Misstatements
Direct evidence on the relationship between family control and the incidence of
accounting misstatement is scarce. Therefore, we briefly review the literature that elaborates
the unique characteristics of family ownership and some empirical evidence on the
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relationship between family firms and the quality of accounting information, from which we
then introduce our hypotheses.
The literature often points out family owners' greater concern for reputation as a salient
characteristic of family firms. Gilson (2007) points out that 'because of intrafamily
inheritance and family ties, the current generation of decision makers, at least in functional
family businesses, treats the next generation's utility as the equivalent of their own' (p. 643).
Therefore, family owners' desire to pass on successful family businesses to future generations
can constitute a powerful motivation to adopt a long-term investment approach and naturally
give them greater incentives to invest more to build and protect a reputation (Gilson, 2007;
Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Scholnick, 2008). In addition, Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer
(2003) point out that a family name connected to a successful family business may bring in
nonpecuniary or reputational benefits, such as a high social status and political connections.
The analysis thus suggests that controlling families have stronger incentives than nonfamily
blockholders not to misstate their financial statements, because misstatements could impair or
even damage a firm’s reputation, which is more difficult to restore for family firms than for
nonfamily firms.
We argue that family owners in China are likely to have an even greater concern for
reputation than their counterparts in more developed markets. The relatively weak formal
institutions in China, and especially the lack of an effective judicial and investor protection
system, mean outside investors have few channels through which to take action against
controlling shareholders when their rights are jeopardized (MacNeil, 2002; Allen, Qian, &
Qian, 2005). As a result, contracting and financing in China often rely on alternative informal
governance mechanisms. Reputation probably plays the most important role in informal
enforcement, along with relationship (Allen et al., 2005; Gilson, 2007; Fan, Wong, & Zhang,
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2012). This is in stark contrast with contracting in more developed markets where it is largely
based on rule of law.
Controlling families' long-term oriented approach also means they are less interested in
the day-to-day stock price movements, thus giving family-controlled firms less incentive to
manage earnings to manipulate short-term stock prices. In addition, the (frequent) unification
of the positions of controlling shareholder and management, or their dominant power over
nonfamily managers, suggests that controlling families are effective 'monitors-in-place'
(Anderson, Duru, & Reeb, 2009) who are both motivated and well positioned to discipline
managerial agents. Furthermore, family members are often as knowledgeable as managers
about their firms, enabling them to provide effective checks on professional managers.
Consistent with this view, Chen (2005) finds that not only can family owners quickly detect
managers’ manipulation of accounting information, they can also rely less on accountingbased performance measures in designing management compensation. This in turn reduces
managers' opportunistic behaviour in earnings management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976;
Coffee, 2005).
To provide further support to our argument, it is worth pointing out some of the salient
characteristics that differentiate a typical nonfamily firm from a family firm in China. Unlike
in the US and UK where most firms are widely held, the majority of non-SOEs in China have
at least one blockholder with more than 10% of cash flow rights (Ma, Ma, & Tian, 2015). In
fact, the largest blockholder holds an average of 32.6% of all control rights, which is above
the 30% threshold set by the CSRC in determining effective control (Ma, Ma, & Tian, 2013).
Such a concentrated ownership structure gives the controlling shareholder great power in
influencing corporate behaviour. Compared to family owners, nonfamily blockholders
usually have a shorter investment horizon and are less concerned about reputation. As a result,
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nonfamily firms are more likely to expropriate minority shareholders and provide less
transparent information to conceal their expropriation (Ma, Ma, & Tian, 2013, 2015).
Taken together, controlling families' greater concern for reputation and the long-term
nature of their equity holding motivate them to provide high-quality accounting information.
Thus, we present our first hypothesis as follows:
H1: Compared to nonfamily-controlled firms, family-controlled firms are less likely to
misstate their accounting statements.
2.2 Family Control and Market Reactions to Accounting Restatements
Family firms are also characterized by concentrated ownership that may possibly imply
more severe agency problems between large shareholders and minority shareholders.
Minority shareholders, being concerned about the potential risk of expropriation by
controlling families, will demand high-quality accounting information. This suggests that,
compared to minority shareholders in nonfamily-controlled firms, those in family-controlled
firms are more sensitive to the quality and hence the deterioration in the quality of accounting
information. In addition, a strong internal corporate governance system is important in
helping to mitigate agency conflicts, especially when external governance (e.g., statutory
regulation and formal institutions) is weak, such as in the Chinese market. Restatements
provide new information that allows outside investors to learn that either the firm's internal
governance policy is not well designed to prevent controlling shareholders' opportunistic
behaviour, or such a governance system is not effectively implemented (Kinney & McDaniel,
1989). Furthermore, restatements exacerbate the information asymmetry between insiders
and minority shareholders, making it even more difficult for minority shareholders to assess
the efficacy of a firm's internal governance. As minority shareholders are generally more
concerned about controlling shareholders’ opportunistic behaviour in family-controlled firms
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than in nonfamily-controlled firms, the analysis above thus suggests more negative investor
reactions to restatements announced by family-controlled firms.
In addition, a number of studies find that the media (or the press) can play an important
role in identifying and monitoring firm frauds (Miller, 2006). In choosing which firm or fraud
to cover, reporters/publishers will maximize the benefits of articles by focusing on firms that
have high visibility or those where there is a great demand for information (Dyck & Zingales,
2003). The literature finds that the media is more likely to publicize targets or events
involving firms / people who are prominent or of high reputation (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990;
Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). This suggests that, compared to nonfamily firm restatements,
restatements by family-controlled firms, and in particular those involving high-profile
entrepreneurs, are more attractive to readers and more likely to be picked up by the media.
Does such a bias in media coverage affect investor reactions? Dyck and Zingales (2003) find
that stock prices are most reactive to earnings announcements emphasized by the media,
which implies that investors will react more strongly to family firm restatements than to
nonfamily firm restatements, because the former are likely to attract more intense media
coverage.
Finally, firms found to be involved in accounting irregularities and other frauds
commonly take action in a bid to improve corporate governance and to restore investor trust.
Replacing the CEO and/or other members of the firm's top management is one of the most
typical actions (Hennes, Leone, & Miller, 2008; Karpoff et al., 2008). It is a common practice
for the founder or other members from the controlling family to take key management
positions in family firms. The literature has provided theoretical (e.g., Schulze, Lubatkin, &
Dino, 2003) and empirical evidence (e.g., Leone & Liu, 2010) that a top manager from the
controlling family is significantly less likely than an outside manager to be punished or even
fired, especially when such an action will have a spillover effect on family relationships
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outside the business. The discussion here thus suggests that, compared to nonfamily firms,
family firms are often short of one important and effective tool to signal to investors their
intent and commitment to improve corporate governance and to restore investor trust.
Summing up our discussion, on the one hand, minority investors have a higher
expectation that controlling families will be concerned about their reputation ; while, on the
other hand, they have greater concerns about controlling families’ opportunistic behavior.
Thus, they have both a higher expectation about the supply of, and a greater demand for,
high-quality accounting information from family-controlled firms. Once a family-controlled
firm restates its accounting statement, minority investors' initial expectation about reputation
is violated and their concerns about controlling families’ opportunistic behaviour become
dominant. In other words, a restatement by a family firm will turn around investors’ attitude
towards them. Such a perception, together with the unfavourable bias in media coverage, is
likely to lead minority investors to react more negatively to family firm restatements. Thus,
we state our second hypothesis as follows:
H2: Accounting restatements announced by family-controlled firms lead to stronger and
more negative market reactions than restatements announced by nonfamily-controlled firms.
2.3 Expropriation risk and the impact of family control on market reactions
The above analysis suggests that, after the restatement announcement, investors reassess
their expectation and perception about the controlling families' commitments and behaviour.
Specifically, a restatement is likely to lower the credibility of the accounting information in
the restatement firm and increase outside investors' mistrust of the controlling
families/managers, as well as their concerns about controlling families' opportunistic and
expropriating behaviour. Naturally the increase in investors' concern will be more significant
in an environment where such a risk of expropriation is perceived to be higher, for example,
when the controlling shareholders' control-ownership wedge is higher and when corporate
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information is more opaque (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang,
2002; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003; Anderson et al., 2009). Consequently, the more
negative market reactions to family firm restatements will be even more significant. Thus, we
state our third hypothesis as follows:
H3: The impact of family control on market reactions to restatements is more pronounced
when the risk of expropriation by the controlling family is higher.

3. Research Design and Sample
3.1 Research Design
To test our first hypothesis H1, we estimate the following logit model:
k

Misstatε = β 0 + β 1 Family + ∑ β i Control i + Fixεd Effεcts + ε

(1)

2

In this model, Misstate is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm misstates its annual
financial report in a given period; Family is a dummy variable that denotes a familycontrolled firm; and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 is a set of control variables. All control variables in Eq. (1) are
measured in the year when the misstatement occurs and not in the year when a subsequent

restatement is announced. H1 predicts 𝛽𝛽1 to be negative as we expect family control will

lower the likelihood of a firm misstating its financial report.

To test our second hypothesis H2, we estimate the following baseline regression model:
k

Market Re actioni = β 0 + β 1 Family + ∑ β i Control i + Fixed Effects + e i

(2)

2

In this model, Market Reaction is the reaction generated by a firm's announcement of an
accounting restatement and is represented by one of the following four measures: cumulative
abnormal return (CAR), abnormal return variance (ARV), abnormal trading volume (ATV),
or abnormal bid-ask spread (ABAS) over the short-term window surrounding the
announcement. According to H2, family control leads to stronger and more negative market
14

reactions to a restatement announcement. Thus, we expect 𝛽𝛽1 to be negative when market

reaction is measured by CAR and 𝛽𝛽1 to be positive when market reaction is represented by
the other three measures. While it is relatively easy and straightforward to understand an

expected positive 𝛽𝛽1 when market reaction is measured by ARV and ABAS, the reason why
family control is positively associated with ATV is as follows. Karpoff (1987) argues that

volume is positively related to the magnitude of price change and to the price change per se.
Friedman (1969) further points out that a heavy volume of trading reflects differences of
opinion among investors about the future course of prices. We argue that restatements by
family firms result in even greater uncertainty about the credibility of the firms' postrestatement performance, as well as the performance per se, which should be reflected in
larger short-term stock return variances, which in turn are expected to be associated with
larger trading volumes based on the theoretical and empirical evidence in Karpoff (1987) and
Friedman (1969).
In addition to the baseline regression model, we will also examine whether the
relationship between family control and market reactions is affected by the risk of
expropriation by the controlling shareholder (H3). To test our proposition, we estimate the
following regression model:
Market Re actioni = β 0 + β 1 Family
+ β 2 Family ∗ Ownership Wedge ( or Corporate Opacity )
+ β 3 Ownership Wedge ( or Corporate Opacity )
k

+ ∑ β i Control + Fixed Effects + e i

(3)

4

In this model, Ownership Wedge is the difference between the controlling shareholder's
control (voting) rights and cash flow rights; Corporate Opacity, measured by a
comprehensive index that consists of four components based on stock trading information
and analyst coverage, gauges the relative information opaqueness of a firm. We predict that
15

the relationship between family control and market reactions will strengthen as the potential
expropriation risk rises. Thus, the coefficients 𝛽𝛽2 in Eq. (3) are expected to have the same
signs as that of 𝛽𝛽1 in Eq. (2).

We estimate all regressions by controlling for year and industry fixed effects. Industry

dummies are based on the two-digit classification issued by the China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to
minimize the influence of outliers. In line with prior studies, we control for heteroscedasticity
using White-adjusted standard errors.

3.2 Sample Construction
Since 1993 regulators in China have issued a series of laws and regulations in relation to
information disclosure by publicly listed firms. However, it was not until 2004 that regulators
explicitly set the requirement that a listed firm ‘must in a timely manner disclose restated
financial information in the format of a significant event announcement, if there are
accounting errors’. 3 Thus, restatements of substantive significance exist only after 2004.
There are three broad types of announcements of financial information restatements in the
Chinese markets: appending (‘bu chong’ in Chinese pinyin), correcting (‘geng zheng’ in
pinyin), and supplement to correcting (‘bu chong geng zheng’ in pinyin). Appending
announcements, which account for about one half of all restatements (Lei, Wu, Wu, & Rui,
2006), mainly concern ownership, directors, or other corporate governance-related
nonfinancial information. Appending announcements usually have no or little impact on the
valuation of the announcing firms and thus are excluded from this study. Correcting and
supplement to correcting announcements, in contrast, often contain important financial

3

‘Notice of further improving the quality of financial information disclosure by listed companies’, CSRC,

January 6, 2004.

16

information that has a significant impact on firm valuation. Typically, a correcting or
supplement to correcting announcement concerns one or more of the following items:
misinterpreting relevant rules or regulations, recognition of revenues or expenses, asset
transactions, investments, related party transactions, and pending litigations.
A restatement can be either internally initiated by the firm’s management (i.e., a
voluntary restatement) or externally initiated by either its auditor or regulators, such as the
stock exchange or CSRC (i.e., a mandatory restatement). Srinivasan, Wahid, and Yu (2015)
argue that a lower rate of voluntary restatements could probably indicate a lower, rather than
a higher, reporting quality. Therefore, we exclude all voluntary restatements from this study.
Our sample selection procedures are as follows. We first manually check all
announcements containing the keyword 'correction' ('geng zheng' in Chinese pinyin) that are
issued by listed nonfinancial firms on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange websites.
Our sample period spans the years 2004 to 2010.

Although our study focuses on

misstatements and restatements of annual reports only 4, we do not include 'annual' or 'annual
report' in our filtering keywords because we note that a number of restatement
announcements do not contain these two words. In other words, including 'annual' or 'annual
report' in our search would significantly reduce our sample size.
We first exclude 'ST' (special treatment) firms. ST firms are those firms that have made
losses in two consecutive years and face the risk of being delisted if they continue to make
losses for a third year, which gives them a strong incentive to misreport their financial
statements. The trading behaviour of ST firms is also likely to be different from other non-ST
firms. We then restrict our sample to non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) for the

4

Listed firms in China are not mandatorily required to have their quarterly and half-yearly financial statements

formally audited. Thus, these two types of financial statements are not expected to have the same credibility as
annual statements.
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following reasons. SOEs in China often have various political and social objectives, such as
improving employment, strengthening fiscal conditions of local governments, and
maintaining social stability, in addition to operating performance. Therefore, compensation
and/or promotion of managers of SOEs rely less on accounting measures when compared to
managers of non-SOEs. Moreover, SOEs' access to bank loans is also less related to firm
performance. Thus, compared to managers of non-SOEs, managers of SOEs have weaker
incentives to manipulate accounting earnings. Furthermore, Firth et al. (2011) point out that
even when false accounting has occurred, disclosure of it through accounting restatements is
less likely for SOEs than for non-SOEs. We require that a firm is a non-SOE both in the year
of misstatement and in the year of restatement. We identify 420 restatements announced by
non-SOEs during our sample period.
Following Firth et al. (2011), we next limit our sample to restatements that affect
revenues, net earnings, or/and assets. We also exclude restatements resulting from minor or
technical errors (e.g., nondisclosure of immaterial information, misprints, or simple
miscalculations in the original annual reports), because Hennes et al. (2008) emphasize the
importance of distinguishing between errors and irregularities. These criteria reduce the
sample size to 183. 5 Next, we exclude restatements that are corrections or supplementary
restatements to previously announced restatements. This requirement further reduces our
sample size to 177. Finally, we eliminate observations that lack the required stock trading
data. As a result, our selection criteria yield a final sample of 151 restatements. Our sample
construction procedure is summarized in Table 1.
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; Leone & Liu, 2010; Firth et
al., 2011; Kryzanowski & Zhang, 2013), we adopt a matched-firm approach. We match each
of our 151 restatement firms with a matching firm that satisfies all of the following criteria:
5

Please refer to Appendix B for examples of accounting errors and irregularities.
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Table 1 Sample selection
This table summarizes our sample selection process. The sample period is between 2004 and 2010.
Each restatement firm is matched with a control firm that is based on size, IPO year, stock exchange,
and CSRC two-digit industry code. Each control firm is required to have not announced a
restatement within a five-year window.
Number of restatements of annual reports identified on the Shenzhen and
Shanghai Stock Exchange websites
492
(requiring that a firm is a non-SOE in the year the restatement is announced)
Less restatements where the firm is an SOE in the year of misstatement
(72)
All restatements issued by non-state-controlled firms
420
Less restatements that result from minor and/or technical errors
(237)
Restatements that involve corrections to revenue, earnings, or assets
183
Less restatements that are a correction or supplementary to previous
(6)
restatements
Less restatements that lack required stock trading data
(26)
Sample of restatements
151
Plus matching firms
151
Total sample of restatement and matching firms
302

(1) has the same CSRC two-digit industry code as the restatement firm; (2) is a non-SOE both
in the year of misstatement and in the year of restatement; (3) has the closest size (total assets)
to the restatement firm; (4) does not announce any material restatements within a five-year
window (two years before and two years after) surrounding the announcement of a
restatement by the restatement firm; (5) has been listed for the same number of years (and on
the same stock exchange when possible) as the restatement firm; and (6) is not an ST firm.
The average misstatement firm is slightly smaller than the average matching firm (p = 0.093).
We control for firm size in all multivariate regressions.
We obtain our accounting, ownership, and other corporate governance data from the
China Securities Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Compiled by
Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Company Ltd., CSMAR is one of the most widely
used databases for research on the Chinese stock market. Daily stock return and trading
volume data are also from CSMAR; while data used to calculate bid-ask spreads is provided
by Securities Industry Research Centre of Australia (SIRCA).
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3.3 Variable Definitions
3.3.1 Family control
Because of concentrated ownership in many European and East Asian countries,
researchers commonly apply a minimum threshold for the largest shareholder's ownership to
ensure effective control (Fan & Wong, 2002; Dyck & Zingales, 2004). In this study, we use a
dummy variable Family to denote family control if: (1) the founder and members of the
founding family (either by blood or through marriage) hold at least 20% of the firm's control
rights; and (2) the founding family (all family members combined) is the ultimate largest
shareholder.
In addition to the criteria described above we also apply some other rules in determining a
family-controlled firm, given the unique characteristics of the Chinese markets. First, if a
firm is established by more than one family, we regard the family with the largest control
rights as the controlling family. Second, private individuals were not allowed to own or
control a business until some years after the start of the economic reform; until then many
businesses were registered as village and town enterprises (VTEs), even though they were
founded and controlled by natural persons. There firms were later re-registered as private
enterprises when this was permitted by the new laws. In those cases these firms are regarded
as family firms if they meet the two criteria of our family firm definition (i.e., ultimate largest
shareholder with at least 20% control rights). In some other cases, managers of VTEs later
become the controlling shareholders through management buyouts. We view these firms as
nonfamily firms, even if the controlling shareholders have more than 20% of control rights.

3.3.2 Market reactions
In this paper, we test market reactions to restatement announcements with four measures,
namely cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), abnormal return variance (ARV), abnormal
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trading volume (ATV), and abnormal bid-ask spread (ABAS), over the event window
surrounding the announcement.
We follow prior studies such as Firth et al. (2011) and Pevzner, Xie, and Xin (2015) to
calculate CAR using the market-adjusted-model returns. We first calculate the daily abnormal
return (AR) over the event window from the following model:
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 )

where 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the AR of firm i on day t, 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the actual stock return (dividend adjusted) of

firm i on day t, 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 is the market return (dividend adjusted) on day t, and 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 are the

market model estimates of firm i obtained from the estimation window [-120, -21]. We then
sum 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 to calculate the CAR over the event window.

We adopt the approach in DeFond, Hung, and Trezevant (2007) and Pevzner et al. (2015)

to calculate the ARV as follows. We obtain the stock return variance over the event window
2
as the average of the squared market-adjusted return 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
. We next obtain the stock return

variance over the estimation window [-120, -21] as the variance of the residual returns from

each firm's market model estimated over the estimation window. The ARV is then calculated
as the ratio of the stock return variance over the event window to the stock return variance
over the estimation window.
We again follow DeFond et al. (2007) and Pevzner et al. (2015) to calculate the ATV by
dividing the average daily trading volume over the event window by the average daily trading
volume over the estimation window [-120, -21], where trading volume is measured as the
number of shares traded on day t scaled by the total number of tradable shares outstanding on
day t.
We measure the ABAS as the average bid-ask spread over the event window divided by
the average bid-ask spread over the estimation window [-120, -21]. Following prior studies
such as Cai (2004) and Firth et al. (2011), we use the relative bid-ask spread, i.e., absolute
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spread divided by the average of bid and ask, in our tests. The average relative spread is then
calculated as the mean relative spread measured in hourly intervals over the event window
and the estimation window, respectively.

3.3.3 Expropriation risk
To test H3, we use two variables that are commonly used in the literature as proxies for
controlling shareholders' expropriation risk. They are the divergence between controlling
shareholder's control and cash flow rights (Ownership wedge) (e.g., Shleifer & Vishny, 1997;
Claessens et al., 2002) and the opacity of a firm's information disclosure (Corporate opacity)
(e.g., Leuz et al., 2003; Anderson et al., 2009).
Following prior studies, the control-ownership wedge is calculated as the difference
between control rights and cash flow rights of the ultimate largest shareholder. A larger
wedge indicates higher risk of expropriation by the controlling shareholder.
To construct the corporate opacity index, we first calculate the four individual
components of opacity, namely trading volume, log of the number of analysts following the
firm, proportion of zero-return trading days, and daily stock return volatility. We next rank
each of these four components into deciles, with a value of 10 representing the most opaque
firms and a value of 1 representing the least opaque firms. We then sum these four
components and divide it by a factor of 40, which is the maximum possible value. This
process yields a corporate opacity index that ranges from 0.1 to 1, with higher values
indicating greater information opacity and higher expropriation risk.

3.3.4 Control variables
We include a set of control variables in our regression models, following prior studies.
Firm size (Firm size), profitability (ROA), financial leverage (Leverage), and whether the
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firm records a loss in the previous year (Negative EPS) are found to be associated with the
occurrence of accounting restatements in a large number of studies (e.g., Kinney & McDaniel,
1989; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1991; Cao et al., 2012). Starting from 2005, China has
conducted a nontradable share (NTS) reform. After the NTS reform, those previous
nontradable shares (often held by blockholders) become freely tradable in the stock market.
This may have two opposite effects on the likelihood of misstatements. On the one hand,
blockholders may become more concerned about potential negative market reactions once
misstatements are caught. One the other hand, blockholders may have a greater incentive to
misstate financial statements in order to manipulate stock prices. It’s unclear which
motivation will dominate. Thus, we introduce a dummy variable Reform, which equals 1 if a
firm has completed the NTS reform and zero otherwise.
We also control for several corporate governance variables in our regressions. A large
number of studies find a positive association between a firm’s earnings quality and the
external auditor being Big N, both in the international setting (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1991;
Teoh & Wong, 1993; Faber, 2005) and for the Chinese market (Chen, Chen, Lobo, & Wang,
2011; Firth et al., 2011). We therefore control for external auditor identity (Big auditor) and
whether a firm receives a modified (nonstandard) opinion on its annual report (MAO)
(Kinney & McDaniel, 1989; Chen, Cumming, Hou, & Lee, 2013). Big auditor is coded 1 if a
firm hires one of the international Big Four auditors, or the six largest national auditors by
revenue, to audit its financial reports. 6 Board independence or the ratio of outside directors
(Outside directors) is a commonly used variable in evaluating the strength of corporate
governance and has been found to be associated with a lower probability of financial

6

Inevitably, it is a subjective judgment as to how many auditors are deemed to be big auditors. As a robustness

check, we alternatively classify the largest eight (Chen et al., 2011) or the largest 15 auditors (Firth et al., 2011)
as big auditors. Our main findings are robust to these alternative definitions.
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misreporting (Cao et al., 2012; Kryzanowski & Zhang, 2013). We also control for the
existence of an audit committee within the firm (Audit committee), which is a dummy
variable, and the financial expertise of the board (AF background), which is measured by the
proportion of board members who have either an accounting or financial background,
following a large body of literature that examines the impact of these two factors on
earnings/financial reporting quality (e.g., DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1991; Agrawal & Chadha,
2005; Firth et al., 2011). Finally, we control for the equity ownership by the largest
blockholder (Top shares), following Firth et al. (2011).
Detailed descriptions of the key variables used in this paper are listed in Appendix A.

4. Empirical Results
4.1 Summary Statistics
We report the yearly distribution of our restatement sample firms in Table 2.
Restatements by family-controlled firms account for 36 of the total 151 restatements (or
23.8%) in our sample. On average about 3.0% of family-controlled firms restate their
financial reports each year (column (d)), which is significantly lower than the overall
percentage of restatements at about 4.5% (column (b)). An alternative comparison also shows
the lower likelihood of restatement by family-controlled firms than by nonfamily-controlled
firms. Across the whole market, family-controlled firms account for about 35.9% of all listed
firms during our sample period (column (e)), but restatements by family firms represent only
about 23.8% of all restatements announced (column (f)). Even in the year 2008, when the
ratio of family restatements to all restatements is at its highest level, only less than one third
(31.8%) of all restatements are announced by family-controlled firms.

24

Table 2 Sample distribution
This table reports the distribution of sample firms (restatement firms only) by year and by whether they are family-controlled firms.
Year
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Total

Number of
restatements

Ratio of restatements
all listed firms (%)

Number of
family restatements

a
10
31
26
16
22
20
26
151

b
3.0
7.9
6.1
3.4
4.1
3.4
4.1
4.5

c
1
4
7
4
7
6
7
36

Ratio of family
restatements to all
family firms (%)
d
1.1
3.5
5.7
2.7
3.4
2.4
2.4
3.0

Ratio of family firms
to all listed firms (%)
e
26.6
29.2
29.1
31.9
38.4
41.4
45.0
35.9

Ratio of family
restatements to all
restatements (%)
f
10.0
12.9
26.9
25.0
31.8
30.0
26.9
23.8
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Table 3 Univariate analyses on mean differences between misstatement firms and matching firms
All variables are defined in Appendix A. P-values based on one-tailed t-tests are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.

Family

Misstatement firms
(1)
Mean
Std. Dev.
0.238
0.043

Mean
0.338

Std. Dev.
0.048

Firm size

20.767

0.906

20.957

1.044

Leverage

0.903

0.808

0.690

0.953

ROA

0.024

0.014

0.024

0.013

Top shares

0.215

0.140

0.242

0.162

Negative EPS

0.264

0.442

0.113

0.318

Reform

0.528

0.501

0.572

0.496

Outside directors

0.359

0.059

0.360

0.065

Big auditor

0.205

0.406

0.265

0.443

MAO

0.179

0.384

0.033

0.180

Audit committee

0.464

0.500

0.470

0.501

AF background

0.290

0.227

0.317

0.196

Obs.

151

Matching firms
(2)

151

Diff. in means
(3) = (1) - (2)
-0.100***
(0.009)
-0.190*
(0.093)
0.213**
(0.012)
0.000
(0.979)
-0.027***
(0.006)
0.151***
(0.000)
-0.044
(0.216)
-0.001
(0.941)
-0.060*
(0.088)
0.146***
(0.000)
-0.006
(0.454)
-0.027
(0.139)
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Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the characteristics of the restatement and
matching firms. Note that all variables in Table 3 are measured in the year when the
misstatement occurs.
Family firms account for about 23.8% of the misstatement firms and about 33.8% of the
matching firms. In other words, compared to matching firms, misstatement firms are less
likely to be family firms. The difference is significant at the 1% level. Misstatement firms on
average are slightly smaller than matching firms as measured by total assets. Misstatement
firms have a substantially higher debt level than matching firms, which is consistent with
prior studies (e.g., Kinney & McDaniel, 1989; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1991). Firms with net
loss in the prior year (Negative EPS) are significantly more likely to misstate their financial
reports. This is not surprising because loss-making firms have strong incentives to manipulate
their accounting numbers in order to conceal their true financial performance and/or to avoid
the ST designation. Noticeably, there are no significant differences between misstatement
firms and matching firms in several key corporate governance variables, such as board
independence, the existence of an audit committee, and board members' accounting and
financial expertise. These variables are found to be negatively associated with the likelihood
of misstatements in Western countries (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005, Cao et al., 2012;
Kryzanowski & Zhang, 2013). The data thus indicates that these corporate governance
mechanisms fail to deter Chinese firms from misstating financial reports. Consistent with
prior studies, misstatement firms are less likely to hire a big external auditor and more likely
to be issued with a modified auditor's opinion prior to misstatement.

4.2 Family Control and Misstatements
We test our first hypothesis H1 by estimating the regression model specified in Eq. (1)
and report the results in Table 4.
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Table 4 Family control and the likelihood of a firm misstating its financial report
This table presents logistic regression results on the relationship between family control and the likelihood of a firm misstating its financial report. All
variables are defined in Table 1. P-values based on White standard errors are reported next to coefficients. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable:

Family
Firm size
Leverage
ROA
Top share
Negative EPS
Reform
Outside directors
Big auditor
MAO
Audit committee
AF background
Constant
Year effect
Industry effect
Pseudo R-squared
Wald Chi2
Obs.

coefficient
-0.744***

0.071

(1)

Included
Included
2.12%
5.48**
302

Misstate
p-value
0.010

0.962

coefficient
-0.733**
-0.211
0.136**
-7.434
-1.734**
0.435**
0.266
0.790
-0.259
2.187***
-0.079
0.515
3.850

(2)

Included
Included
7.53%
28.68***
302

p-value
0.018
0.187
0.032
0.516
0.046
0.014
0.289
0.724
0.148
0.000
0.810
0.422
0.269
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The dependent variable in both columns (1) and (2) is the likelihood of a firm misstating
its financial report. In column (1), where the family control dummy is the only independent
variable other than year and industry fixed effects, we find that family control has a
significant and negative effect (coef. = -0.744, p = 0.010) on accounting misstatements. In
column (2), we control for a set of variables including firm-specific characteristics, auditor
attributes, and firm performance. The coefficient of Family remains negative and significant,
although its magnitude (-0.733 vs. -0.744) and statistical significance (p = 0.018 vs. p = 0.010)
become slightly lower. These findings provide support for our prediction in H1 that familycontrolled firms are less likely than nonfamily-controlled firms to misstate their financial
statements, even after controlling for other factors.
With respect to control variables, the results are mostly consistent with the univariate
statistics reported in Table 3. The main differences are for firm size and auditor quality.
Neither the coefficient of Firm size nor Big auditor in Table 4 is significant, indicating that
these two factors do not significantly affect the likelihood of accounting misstatements after
controlling for family control and other firm-specific factors. While they are found to be
different between misstatement firms and control firms in Table 3, these results shouldn't be
too surprising because the difference in firm size and auditor quality between these two group
of firms is only marginal (p = 0.093 and p = 0.088, respectively, in Table 3).

4.3 Family Control and Market Reactions to Restatements
4.3.1 Short-term reactions
In this subsection, we test H2 in two steps. We first compare short-term market reactions
to family firm restatements and to nonfamily firm restatements. The univariate tests are done
over three event windows, [0, +1], [-1, +1], and [-3, +3], with day 0 being the announcement
day. The results are reported in Table 5.
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Table 5 Comparison of market reactions to restatements by family firms and by nonfamily firms
This table presents univariate tests of the different market reactions to restatements announced by family firms and by nonfamily firms, for short windows
surrounding announcements (column (6)). CAR is the cumulative abnormal return. ARV is the abnormal return variance. ATV is the abnormal trading
volume. ABAS is the abnormal bid-ask spread. This table also tests whether the market reactions are different from zero for restatements by family firms
and nonfamily firms, respectively. P-values in columns (3) and (5) are based on H0=0 (CAR) and H0=1 (ARV, ATV, and ABAS). Significances are based on pvalues using the two-tailed t-test, except for those in column (6) which are based on one-tailed t-test.

CAR [0, +1] (%)
CAR [-1, +1] (%)
CAR [-3, +3] (%)
ARV [0, +1]
ARV [-1, +1]
ARV [-3, +3]
ATV [0, +1]
ATV [-1, +1]
ATV [-3, +3]
ABAS [0, +1]
ABAS [-1, +1]
ABAS [-3, +3]

All
restatements
(1)
-1.481
-2.122
-2.665
2.661
1.499
1.538
1.462
1.401
1.432
2.508
2.323
2.127

Family firm
restatements
(2)
-2.603
-3.601
-4.575
2.700
1.791
1.898
1.949
1.924
2.019
2.793
2.633
2.395

p-value
(3)
0.001
0.001
0.006
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Nonfamily firm
restatements
(4)
-1.130
-1.660
-2.067
2.221
1.408
1.437
1.310
1.238
1.248
1.588
1.324
1.262

p-value
(5)
0.016
0.004
0.003
0.000
0.000
0.008
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.007
0.009

Diff. in means
(6) = (2) – (4)
-1.473**
-1.941**
-2.508*
0.479**
0.383**
0.461**
0.639**
0.686***
0.771***
1.205**
1.309**
1.133***

p-value

(H0: Diff = 0)

(7)
0.044
0.034
0.056
0.024
0.039
0.030
0.012
0.005
0.005
0.045
0.021
0.008
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We then use market reactions during the window [-1, +1] as our dependent variables to
estimate our baseline regression model, as specified in Eq. (2), and report the regression
results in Table 6. In unreported tests, we use market reactions over windows [0, +1] and [-3,
+3] as dependent variables and find that our main findings remain qualitatively unchanged.
Short-term market reactions, measured by CAR, ARV, ATV, and ABAS, to all
restatements, family firm restatements, and nonfamily restatements are reported in column
(1), column (2), and column (4), respectively. Consistent with our expectation, CARs are
negative while ARVs, ATVs, and ABASs are all positive for both family firm restatements
and nonfamily firm restatements. All the p-values in column (3) and column (5) are
significant at the 1% level, with only one exception (CAR [0, +1] for nonfamily firm
restatements) which is significant at the 5% level. These statistics show that accounting
restatements are associated with significantly negative short-term abnormal stock returns and
increased investor uncertainty about the firms' future performance.
Our focus is the differences in market reactions to family firm restatements and
nonfamily firm restatements, as reported in column (6). As we can see, compared to
restatements announced by nonfamily firms, restatements announced by family firms are
associated with more negative short-term abnormal stock returns. For example, over the
three-day window, CAR [-1, +1] is -3.601% for family firm restatements but only -1.660%
for nonfamily firm restatements. The difference is significant at the 5% level (p = 0.034). The
differences for the other three measures are all significant as well. For example, ARV [-1, +1]
for family firm restatements is 1.791, which is significantly larger than ARV [-1, +1] for
nonfamily firm restatements (p = 0.039).
In summary, the data in Table 5 shows that, although both family firm restatements and
nonfamily firm restatements result in negative short-term abnormal stock returns and increase
uncertainty among investors about the restatement firms' future performance, the
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consequences are significantly more severe for family firm restatements. The statistics in
Table 5 are consistent with our prediction in H2.
We further test H2 with multivariate regressions and report the results in Table 6.
Our purpose here is to test any differences in market reactions between family firm
restatements and nonfamily firm restatements, and thus the sample in Table 6 contains all
restatement firms but no matching firms. We run four sets of regressions using CAR, ARV,
ATV, and ABAS, as the dependent variable, respectively. For each of the four market
reaction measures we estimate two regression models: one uses the family control dummy as
the only independent variable, apart from year and industry fixed effects, and the other model
also includes a set of control variables.
As can be seen from Table 6, the coefficient of Family is significant in all eight model
specifications. The sign of the coefficient is consistent with the statistics reported in column
(6) of Table 5. Specifically, the coefficient of Family is negative when CAR is the dependent
variable and is positive when ARV, ATV, or ABAS is the dependent variable. The magnitude
of the coefficient of Family becomes even larger when control variables are included in the
regression, e.g., -2.181 in column (2) compared to -1.777 in column (1).
Taken together, the findings in Table 5 and Table 6 indicate that when a firm announces
an accounting restatement, being family-controlled is associated with significantly more
negative short-term stock returns (CAR), higher abnormal return variance (ARV), higher
abnormal trading volume (ATV), and larger abnormal bid-ask spread (ABAS). These
findings suggest that investors are more concerned about the deterioration in accounting
earnings quality in family firms and consequently react more strongly to restatements
announced by family firms than those by nonfamily firms. The findings thus support our
hypothesis H2.
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Table 6 Family control and market reactions surrounding restatement announcements
This table presents regression results on the relationship between family control and short-window market reactions surrounding restatement
announcements. All variables are defined in Appendix. P-values based on White standard errors (White, 1980) are reported in parentheses. *, ** and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variables:
Family
Firm size
Leverage
Top share
Negative EPS
MAO
Outside directors
Constant
Year effect
Industry effect
Obs.
Adj. R-squared
F-statistic

Cumulative abnormal return
CAR [-1,+1]
(1)
(2)
-1.777**
-2.181**
(0.032)
(0.011)
1.293
(0.430)
-0.884**
(0.031)
0.041*
(0.066)
-1.468*
(0.097)
-1.075
(0.113)
0.052
(0.894)
-0.717*
-5.610*
(0.060)
(0.076)
Included
Included
Included
Included
151
151
3.14%
7.93%
4.69**
2.74**

Abnormal return variance
ARV [-1, +1]
(3)
(4)
0.376**
0.396**
(0.045)
(0.049)
-0.243
(0.292)
0.221**
(0.039)
-0.427
(0.583)
0.256*
(0.061)
0.460*
(0.098)
0.080
(0.665)
1.409***
-3.548**
(0.000)
(0.045)
Included
Included
Included
Included
151
151
5.52%
6.41%
7.66***
2.66**

Abnormal trading volume
ATV [-1, +1]
(5)
(6)
0.716***
0.771***
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.154
(0.434)
0.120*
(0.065)
0.402
(0.532)
0.064
(0.852)
0.268**
(0.055)
0.025
(0.876)
1.231***
-2.043*
(0.000)
(0.066)
Included
Included
Included
Included
151
151
12.84%
14.46%
12.78***
2.65**

Abnormal bid-ask spread
ABAS [-1, +1]
(7)
(8)
1.817**
1.911**
(0.049)
(0.038)
-0.999**
(0.020)
0.052
(0.764)
-0.729
(0.804)
1.090
(0.271)
1.200*
(0.095)
-0.021
(0.751)
1.534***
23.340**
(0.001)
(0.015)
Included
Included
Included
Included
151
151
2.90%
15.19%
2.11**
1.75**
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4.3.2 Expropriation risk and the impact of family control
In this subsection we perform additional tests to examine whether controlling for the risk
of expropriation by shareholders perceived by investors has any effect on the relationship
between family control and short-term market reactions (i.e., H3). The tests are based on
regression models specified in Eq. (3). More specifically, we add to our baseline regression
models specified in Eq. (2) a stand-alone variable as a proxy for expropriation risk and its
interaction with family control. The regression results are reported in Table 7.
As in Table 6, we run four sets of regressions using CAR, ARV, ATV, and ABAS, as the
dependent variable, respectively. And for each dependent variable we estimate two regression
models: one uses the ultimate largest shareholder's control-ownership wedge as the proxy for
expropriation risk and the other uses corporate opacity as the proxy.
In each of the eight models, the coefficient of Family remains significant and keeps the
sign of its corresponding coefficient in Table 6. The results indicate that even for firms with
low wedge and low opacity (i.e., firms with relatively low expropriation risk), family control
still triggers stronger reactions from investors. The coefficient of the stand-alone variable
Ownership wedge is significant across all four models and has the same sign as that of Family.
This indicates that control-ownership wedge, like family control, also increases investor
concern about agency problems and uncertainty. The coefficient of the stand-alone variable
Corporate opacity, although having the same sign as that of Ownership wedge, is not
significant across all four models. The results suggest that when market reaction is measured
by CAR or ATV, the level of corporate opacity has no significant effect on how investors
react to restatements announced by nonfamily firms. Our main interest is the interaction
terms Family*Ownership wedge and Family*Corporate opacity, which capture the
incremental effect of expropriation risk on market reactions to family firm restatements.
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Table 7 Expropriation risk and the impact of family control on market reactions to restatement announcements
This table presents regression results of how the impact of family control on short-window market reactions surrounding restatement announcements is
affected by the potential risk of expropriation by controlling families. The potential expropriation risk is measured by control-ownership wedge and
corporate opacity. All variables are defined in Appendix. P-values based on White standard errors (White, 1980) are reported in parentheses. *, ** and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variables:
Family
Family * Ownership wedge
Family * Corporate opacity
Ownership wedge
Corporate Opacity
Firm size
Leverage
Top share
Negative EPS
MAO
Outside directors
Constant

Cumulative abnormal return
CAR [-1, +1]
(1)
(2)
-1.148*
-3.947*
(0.053)
(0.052)
-0.106**
(0.042)
-4.252*
(0.064)
-0.106**
(0.029)
-3.668
(0.204)
1.031
1.333
(0.157)
(0.277)
-0.833*
-0.840**
(0.059)
(0.048)
0.048**
0.041*
(0.046)
(0.067)
-1.411*
-1.425
(0.098)
(0.101)
-1.340*
-1.409*
(0.089)
(0.083)
0.044
0.023
(0.454)
(0.690)
4.822**
7.315*
(0.023)
(0.065)

Abnormal return variance
ARV [-1, +1]
(3)
(4)
0.679**
1.821**
(0.023)
(0.022)
0.752**
(0.026)
2.696**
(0.045)
0.181*
(0.057)
0.757*
(0.093)
-0.207
-0.310
(0.358)
(0.210)
0.203*
0.227**
(0.051)
(0.048)
-0.308
-0.440
(0.694)
(0.569)
0.196*
0.244**
(0.074)
(0.042)
0.491*
0.420*
(0.077)
(0.094)
0.122
0.120
(0.492)
(0.506)
-3.383**
-5.366**
(0.045)
(0.028)

Abnormal trading volume
ATV [-1, +1]
(5)
(6)
0.900***
1.099*
(0.000)
(0.091)
0.430**
(0.035)
0.929*
(0.086)
0.101*
(0.063)
1.229
(0.430)
-0.160
0.255
(0.416)
(0.225)
0.119*
0.166*
(0.067)
(0.063)
0.358
0.471
(0.589)
(0.460)
0.071
0.067
(0.774)
(0.798)
0.306
0.438
(0.180)
(0.157)
-0.087
-0.103
(0.573)
(0.375)
-1.777*
-2.856**
(0.065)
(0.050)

Abnormal bid-ask spread
ABAS [-1, +1]
(7)
(8)
0.538*
3.123**
(0.092)
(0.030)
1.023**
(0.046)
8.610**
(0.020)
1.182**
(0.033)
8.583**
(0.020)
-1.344*
-1.503*
(0.096)
(0.067)
0.033
0.030
(0.605)
(0.617)
-1.754
-0.794
(0.460)
(0.794)
0.733
0.601
(0.169)
(0.203)
0.860*
1.160*
(0.092)
(0.077)
0.029
0.013
(0.500)
(0.762)
27.956*
28.225*
(0.073)
(0.060)
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Year effect
Industry effect
Obs.
Adj. R-squared
F-statistic

Included
Included
151
6.40%
2.03**

Included
Included
151
8.58%
2.77**

Included
Included
151
4.04%
1.93**

Included
Included
151
7.03%
2.38**

Included
Included
151
10.77%
2.02**

Included
Included
151
14.60%
2.42**

Included
Included
151
5.41%
1.94**

Included
Included
151
14.53%
2.92***
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The coefficient of either Family*Ownership wedge or Family*Corporate opacity is
statistically significant in all eight model specifications. The coefficients of the interaction
terms have the same sign as the corresponding coefficients of the stand-alone Family, i.e.,
negative when CAR is the dependent variable and positive when ARV, ATV, or ABAS is the
dependent variable. These results indicate that the stronger market reactions to family firm
restatements become even more pronounced as the expropriation risk increases.
Overall, the findings in Table 7 indicate that as the risk of expropriation by controlling
shareholders increases, investors have even greater concerns about controlling shareholder's
credibility, agency problems, and uncertainty following restatements. This will further
strengthen the impact of family control on market reactions to restatement announcements.
These findings are consistent with our prediction in H3.

4.4 Additional Tests
4.4.1 The timeline
To investigate the effect of restatement over the longer term, we perform two sets of tests
in this subsection. We first follow up our tests in Section 4.3 to compare the difference in
market reactions (i.e., return variance, trading volume, and bid-ask spread) before the
restatement announcement (window [-120, -21]) and after announcement (window [+21,
+120]), for family restatement firms and nonfamily restatement firms, respectively. See
Figure 1A for the timeline. We then follow the large body of literature to examine the drop in
the information content of earnings (measured by ERC) after the restatement announcement,
by comparing the ERC in one year before and one year after the restatement announcements.
Because we only have annual earnings data, we focus on yearly ERC rather than quarterly
ERC, as in some prior studies such as Wilson (2008) and Chen, Cheng, and Lo (2014). See
Figure 1B for the timeline.
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Figure 1 Illustration of timeline
Figure 1A: Timeline of market reaction tests
Pre-restatement estimation window

Day

-120

-21

Event window

-1

0

+1

Post-restatement estimation window

+21

+120

Figure 1B: Timeline of earnings informativeness tests

Pre-restatement window

May (Year t-2)

April (Year t-1)

Post-restatement window

0

May (Year t+1)

April (Year t+2)
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4.4.2 Longer-term market reactions
In subsection 4.3.1, we examine the differences in market reactions to family firm
restatements and nonfamily firm restatements over three short-term windows, [0, +1], [-1,
+1], and [-3, +3]. In this subsection, we test whether the stronger market reactions to family
firm restatements are still observed over a longer period. The literature provides mixed
empirical evidence on whether the effects of restatements (e.g., the drop in ERC) are shortlived (e.g., Wilson, 2008; Chen et al., 2014). Although it is not our intention to find out
exactly how long the effects of restatements last, the tests we perform in this subsection may
provide complementary evidence to enhance our understanding of the issue.
We first adopt a difference-in-difference approach. We compare the pre- and postrestatement stock return variance, trading volume, and bid-ask spread for restatement firms
and matching firms (i.e., nonrestatement firms), respectively. We then compare the changes
(from pre- to post-restatement period) in these three measures between restatement firms and
matching firms. Because we identify each matching firm based on industry, size, IPO year,
and stock exchange, such a comparison also controls for the influence of these factors. The
results are reported in Panel A of Table 8. The left-hand side of Panel A presents the results
for 36 family restatement firms and 36 matching firms. The right-hand side presents the
results for 115 nonfamily restatement firms and their corresponding matching firms. The preand post-restatement estimation window is [-120, -21] and [+21, +120], respectively, where
day 0 is the restatement announcement day.
We take daily stock return variance as an example. For family restatement firms, the
average return variance increases significantly from 3.311 in the pre-restatement estimation
window to 3.628 in the post-restatement window (diff. = 0.317, p = 0.008). During the same
period, although the matching firms also experience an increase in return variance, their
increase is insignificant (diff. = 0.129, p = 0.182). The difference in the change in return
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Table 8 Longer-term effects of restatement announcements
Panel A: Difference-in-difference tests
Panel A of this table present the difference-in-difference test results of longer term effects of restatement announcements on market reactions, i.e., daily
stock return volatility, daily trading volume, and bid-ask spread. The left-hand side of the table reports the statistics of the family restatement firms (36
firms) and their matching firms. The right-hand side of the table reports the nonfamily restatement firms (115 firms) and their corresponding matching
firms. The pre-restatement estimation window is [-120, -21] and the post-restatement estimation window is [+21, +120], with day 0 being the restatement
announcement day. Stock return variance is the variance of the residual returns from each firm's market model; trading volume is the number of shares
traded on the day divided by the number of tradable shares outstanding on that day; bid-ask spread is the average relative spread (i.e., absolute spread
divided by the average of bid and ask) over the test period measured in hourly intervals. Significances are based on p-values using the one-tailed t-test.

Restatement firms (1)
Stock return
variance

Control firms (2)
(1) – (2)
Restatement firms (1)

Trading
volume

Control firms (2)
(1)– (2)
Restatement firms (1)

Bid-ask
spread

Control firms (2)
(1) – (2)

Family restatement firms
PrePost(b) – (a)
restatement (a) restatement (b)
(p-value)
0.317***
3.311
3.628
(0.008)
0.129
2.977
3.106
(0.182)
0.188**
0.334
0.522
(0.048)
2.382

3.196

2.344

2.678

0.038

0.518

0.236

0.337

0.209

0.258

0.027

0.079

0.814**
(0.030)
0.334
(0.122)
0.480*
(0.054)
0.101**
(0.033)
0.049*
(0.098)
0.052*
(0.064)

Nonfamily restatement firms
PrePost(b) – (a)
restatement (a) restatement (b)
(p-value)
0.105*
3.201
3.306
(0.078)
0.084
3.003
3.087
(0.282)
0.021
0.198
0.219
(0.455)
2.960

3.052

2.768

2.896

0.192

0.156

0.217

0.241

0.222

0.230

-0.005

0.011

0.092
(0.340)
0.128
(0.288)
0.036
(0.411)
0.024
(0.209)
0.008
(0.433)
0.016
(0.218)
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variance (or difference-in-difference, marked in bold font in Panel A) between family
restatement firms and their matching firms is statistically significant (diff. = 0.188, p = 0.048).
In contrast, although nonfamily restatement firms also experience a significant increase in
return variance from 3.201 to 3.306 (diff. = 0.105, p = 0.078), the difference-in-difference is
insignificant (p = 0.455) between nonfamily restatement firms and their matching firms.
These difference-in-difference analyses indicate that while family restatement firms
experience a significant increase in stock return variance over a longer window (up to 120
days after the restatement announcement in our tests) compared to their nonrestatement
matching firms, there is no significant difference in the change in return variance between
nonfamily restatement firms and their matching firms. The results are similar if we look at the
changes in trading volume and bid-ask spread.
We next perform tests to directly compare the changes in return variance, trading volume,
and bid-ask spread between family restatement firms and nonfamily restatement firms, in
addition to comparing the changes between each group of restatement firms and their
corresponding nonrestatement matching firms. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 8.
We again take stock return variance as an example to illustrate the findings. For both
family restatement firms and nonfamily restatement firms, their return variance in the postrestatement period is significantly larger than that in the pre-restatement period (p = 0.008 for
family firms and p = 0.078 for nonfamily firms). When we look at the difference in the
change, we can see that the increase in return variance is significantly larger for family firms
than for nonfamily firms (diff. = 0.212, p = 0.030). In other words, the impact of the
restatement announcement on return variance increase is more pronounced for family
restatement firms than for nonfamily restatement firms. Comparisons in trading volume and
bid-ask spread yield similar results.
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Table 8 Longer-term effects of restatement announcements
Panel B: Direct comparison between family restatement firms and nonfamily restatement firms
Panel B presents the statistics using an alternative approach to compare the difference in change in return variance, trading volume, and bid-ask spread
between family restatement firms and nonfamily restatement firms. We then compare the changes in these measures between family restatement firms
and nonfamily restatement firms, following restatement announcements.

Family firms (1)
Stock return variance

Nonfamily firms (2)
(1) –(2)
Family firms (1)

Trading volume

Nonfamily firms (2)
(1) –(2)
Family firms (1)

Bid-ask spread

Nonfamily firms (2)
(1) –(2)

Pre-restatement
(a)

Post-restatement
(b)

3.311

3.628

3.201

3.306

0.110

0.322

2.382

3.196

2.960

3.052

-0.578

0.144

0.236

0.337

0.217

0.241

0.019

0.096

(b)-(a)
(p-value)
0.317***
(0.008)
0.105*
(0.078)
0.212**
(0.030)
0.814**
(0.030)
0.092
(0.340)
0.722*
(0.057)
0.101**
(0.033)
0.024
(0.209)
0.077*
(0.051)
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Overall, the findings in Table 8 indicate that while both family restatement firms and
nonfamily restatement firms experience an increase in return variance, trading volume, and
bid-ask spread following the restatement announcement, the impact is substantially more
significant for family restatement firms. In fact, there is no significant difference in these
three measures between nonfamily restatement firms and their matching firms up to 120 days
after the restatement announcement. But for family restatement firms, the increases are still
observed.

4.4.3 Information content of earnings (ERC)
The earnings response coefficient (ERC) is the most commonly used empirical measure
of information content of earnings and a popular proxy for earnings quality (Dechow et al.,
2010). A large number of studies document a significant drop in the ERC after restatement
announcements (e.g., Anderson & Yohn, 2002; Wu, 2002; Wilson, 2008; Chen et al., 2014).
According to Chen et al. (2014), the key argument underlying the drop in the ERC is that the
credibility of financial reporting is lower after the restatement. This argument suggests that
the drop in the ERC is expected to be more severe for family restatement firms than for
nonfamily restatement firms, because we argue throughout this paper that family restatement
firms are subject to greater credibility concerns.
To test our prediction, we follow prior studies (e.g., Fan & Wang, 2002; Chen et al., 2014)
to estimate the following model (Equation 4):

Returnt = b 0 + b 1 NI t + b 2 NI t * Family t + b 3 NI t * Post
+ b 4 NI t * Post * Family t + b 5 NI t * Firm Sizet
+ b 6 NI t * Tobin Qt + b 7 NI t * Leveraget + Fixed Effects + e t

(4)

In this model, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 is the cumulative net-of-market 12-month stock returns at year t,

calculated from monthly stock returns from May to April (April 30 is the deadline for listed
firms in China to release their annual reports). 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 is the net earnings of year t divided by the
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market value of equity at the beginning of year t. Post is a dummy variable that indicates the
post-restatement financial year. Our focus is on the coefficient 𝛽𝛽4 .We expect that because
investors are more concerned about restatements by family firms, post-restatement earnings

of family firms will be even less informative than those of nonfamily firms. Therefore, 𝛽𝛽4 is
expected to be negative and significant. We report the regression results in Table 9.

The tests in Table 9 include only restatement firms. The positive and significant
coefficient of NI across all columns indicates that stock prices do respond to earnings in the
Chinese stock markets. The insignificant coefficient of the interaction term NI*Family (coef.
= 0.001, p = 0.999) in column (1) indicates that, prior to restatements, there is no difference
in the ERC between family and nonfamily firms, despite the fact that family firms are less
likely to misstate their financial reports (i.e., family firms have a higher quality of earnings)
as reported in Table 4.
However, the negative and significant coefficient of the interaction term NI*Family in
column (2) (coef. = -8.046, p = 0.000) indicates that after the restatement announcement,
family restatement firms have a significantly lower ERC than nonfamily restatement firms.
The results in column (3) confirm the finding in column (2). Although the negative
coefficient of NI*Post (coef. = -2.847, p = 0.000) indicates that nonfamily restatement firms
also experience a significant drop in the ERC after restatement announcements, the drop is
substantially more severe for family restatement firms, as demonstrated by the interaction
term NI*Post*Family (coef. = -4.304, p = 0.047).
Overall, the findings in Table 9 confirm our prediction that the drop in the ERC after
restatement announcements is more significant for family restatement firms than for
nonfamily restatement firms, because family restatement firms are subject to greater
credibility concerns than nonfamily restatement firms. The findings in Table 9 also provide
additional support for our predictions in H2 and H3.
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Table 9 Family control and the effect of restatement on the information content of earnings
This table presents regression results of the effect of family control on the impact of restatement on the information content of earnings. The dependent
variable is the cumulative net-of-market 12-month stock returns, calculated from monthly stock returns from May to April. Pre-restatement (columns (1))
refers to pre-restatement financial year (Year t-1) and post-restatement (columns (2)) refers to post-restatement financial year (Year t+1), where Year t
refers to the year in which the restatement announcement falls. Post is a dummy variable indicating post-restatement financial year (t+1). All other
variables are defined in Appendix. P-values based on White standard errors (White, 1980) are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable:

NI
NI*Family
NI*Post
NI*Post*Family
NI*Firm size
NI*Tobin Q
NI*Leverage
constant
Year effect
Industry effect
Obs.
Adj. R-squared
F-statistic

Cumulative net-of-market 12-month stock returns (Return)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Pre-restatement
Post-restatement
Full sample period
coefficient
p value
coefficient
p value
coefficient
p value
32.149***
0.008
40.580***
0.003
31.472***
0.000
0.001
0.999
-8.046***
0.000
0.068
0.604
-2.847***
0.000
-4.304**
0.047
1.648***
0.004
1.857***
0.003
1.373***
0.004
-0.996***
0.001
-0.277
0.153
-0.353**
0.026
0.650***
0.001
-0.018
0.976
0.428
0.277
-0.086
0.684
0.619**
0.038
0.334
0.108
Included
Included
Included
Included
Included
Included
151
151
151
5.03%
51.24%
23.41%
11.99***
11.32***
3.91***
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5. Robustness Tests
5.1 Family Firms’ Greater Concern for Reputation or Alternative Explanations?
So far in this paper, we attribute the lower rate of misstatements in family firms to the
nature of family ownership, i.e., family owners’ longer investment horizon and greater
concern for reputation. However, it is also possible that there exist other systemic differences
between family and nonfamily firms that explain the different rates of misstatements in these
two groups of firms. We carry out additional tests in this section to test this possibility.
Prior studies find that a firm is less likely to misstate its financial report if it has a higher
percentage of outside directors and directors with accounting or financial expertise, if the
positons of CEO and the chair of the board are held by different persons, if there exists an
audit committee, and the firm’s external auditor is one of the Big N. In addition, the greater
the number of financial analysts following the firm and the higher the frequency of board
meetings, the more likely it is that accounting misstatements will be discovered and thus the
lower the incentive for the management to engage in misreporting (Dechow, Sloan, &
Sweeney, 1996; Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; Cumming, Hou, & Lee, 2011; Firth et al., 2011;
Cao et al., 2012; Kryzanowski & Zhang, 2013).
Building on the evidence in these studies, we conduct two sets of tests. First, we test
whether there are significant differences in the abovementioned characteristics between
family and nonfamily firms for the whole sample that includes both restatement firms and
matched firms. Second, we repeat the tests for the restatement firms only. The test results are
reported in Table 10.
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 10 represent the results for the whole sample. As we can see,
there is no significant difference between family and nonfamily firms in the percentage of
outside directors, the number of board meetings, the percentage of firms with an audit
committee, the percentage of directors with accounting or financial background, and the
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Table 10 Tests for possible alternative explanations for the lower likelihood of misstatements in family firms
This table presents the results of tests that compare several corporate governance characteristics between family and nonfamily firms. Columns (1) to (3)
include the full sample that consists of both restatement firms and matched firms. Columns (4) to (6) include only restatement firms. Significances are
based on p-values using the one-tailed t-test. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Outside directors
Number of board meetings
Audit committee
AF background
CEO and Chair the same person
Big auditor
Number of financial analysts
Obs.

Full sample (restatement firms & matched firms)
(1)
(2)
(3)=(1)-(2)
Family
Nonfamily
Diff.
0.362
0.358
0.004
8.828
9.177
-0.349
0.494
0.456
0.038
0.288
0.310
-0.022
0.184
0.153
0.031
0.299
0.209
0.090*
3.656
5.443
-1.787**
87
215

(4)
Family
0.360
9.000
0.472
0.324
0.139
0.222
2.361
36

Restatement firms only
(5)
Nonfamily
0.359
9.339
0.461
0.314
0.183
0.200
4.983
115

(6)=(4)-(5)
Diff.
0.001
-0.339
0.011
0.010
-0.044
0.022
-2.621***
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percentage of firms where the CEO and the chair are the same person. Compared to
nonfamily firms, family firms are slightly more likely to hire a Big N auditor. Although a Big
N auditor can help reduce the likelihood of an accounting misstatement, it can also indicate
that family firms have greater incentive to provide higher quality financial information and
therefore are more willing to hire a Big N auditor to help them achieve this.
We also note that compared to nonfamily firms, family firms are followed by fewer
financial analysts. According to the literature, this would suggest that family firms are more
likely, rather than less likely, as we find in this paper, to misstate their financial reports than
nonfamily firms. Thus the results strongly support our argument that it is family owners’
greater concern for reputation that deters them from misreporting.
Columns (4) to (6) represent the test results for the restatement firms only. The results
again show that family restatement firms are followed by fewer financial analysts than
nonfamily restatement firms. There are no significant differences between family restatement
firms and nonfamily restatement firms in all other firm characteristics.
Overall, the results in Table 10 provide strong support for our argument that the lower
rate of misstatements in family firms is attributable to family owners’ greater concern for
reputation, not systemic differences in other corporate governance characteristics.

5.2 Alternative Definitions of Family Firms
In this paper, a firm is defined as a family firm if it satisfies two conditions: (1) the
founder and members of the founding family (either by blood or through marriage) hold at
least 20% of the firm's control rights; and (2) the founding family (all family members
combined) is the ultimate largest shareholder. The literature has used different definitions of
family firms. In this section, we discuss several alternative definitions.
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First, studies using US data typically place no minimum, or a very low threshold, such as
5%, for family ownership in defining family firms (e.g., Villalonga and Amit, 2006;
Anderson et al., 2009). However, because the majority of non-SEOs in China have a
controlling shareholder (Ma et al., 2013) this approach may be inappropriate (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). Nonetheless, if we relax our definition of family firm by
removing the 20% threshold for control rights, the number of family firms increases slightly
from 36 to 37 in the restatement sample and from 87 to 90 in the whole sample. As the
increases are minimal, we do not expect significant changes to our main findings. Robustness
tests using the new samples confirm our expectation.
Second, some other studies only require one or more family members to serve as CEO,
chair, or directors, with or without a significant equity ownership, for a firm to be defined as
a family firm (e.g., Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Chen et al., 2008; Mehrotra, Morck, Shim, &
Wiwattanakantang, 2013).We argue that this definition may not be appropriate for the
Chinese markets for two reasons. First, in countries such as US, founding families can use
dual-class shares to control a substantial proportion of voting rights with a relatively small
ownership. For example, the Ford family own only about 5% of the cash flow rights of Ford
Motors; yet they control 40% of the voting rights. However, dual-class shares are not
permitted in China. Second, many family firms in Western countries are run by or with active
involvement of the third, fourth, or even later generations of the founding family (Villalonga
and Amit, 2006). The multi-generational involvement allows the founding family to insert
significant influence on firm behaviour with even minimal ownership. In contrast, private
ownership of a firm in China has been permitted only in the last three decades or so. As a
result, the founding family can barely influence firm behaviour without a controlling
ownership. For these two reasons, we believe that it is appropriate to require a 20% threshold
for family ownership.
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6. Conclusion and Implications
Family-controlled firms are associated with some of the most high-profile accounting
scandals across the world (e.g., Adelphia in the US, Parmalat in Italy, and Yin Guang Xia in
China). This naturally raises two questions. Are family-controlled firms indeed more likely to
have low-quality accounting information than nonfamily-controlled firms? Does family
control affect investor reactions to the revelation of low quality or the deterioration of
accounting information quality? These questions are important because of increasing
concerns among regulators and other market participants about the widespread and increasing
incidence of accounting irregularities, as well as the fact that family-controlled firms
represent one of the most prevalent forms of organization across the globe. Although the first
question has attracted increasing academic interest, the second question has so far been
largely ignored by researchers.
In this paper, we examine the impact of family control on the likelihood of a firm
misstating its financial report and on investor reactions to accounting restatements, with a
focus on the latter. We find that, compared to nonfamily firms, family firms are significantly
less likely to misstate their financial reports, consistent with the notion that controlling
families have greater reputation concerns than nonfamily blockholders, which gives family
owners a greater incentive to deliver high-quality accounting information.
We also find that following accounting restatements family-controlled firms trigger
substantially stronger investor reactions, measured by more negative cumulative abnormal
returns (CAR), larger abnormal return variance (ARV), larger abnormal trading volume
(ATV), and higher abnormal bid-ask spread (ABAS), over a short window surrounding the
restatement announcements. Further tests show that the stronger investor reactions to family
firm restatements are more pronounced when the risk of expropriation by controlling
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shareholders is higher. These findings indicate that following restatement announcements
investors quickly readjust their views about controlling families' concern for reputation and
the risk of expropriation. Specifically, restatements lower investors' perception of the
credibility of accounting information and ultimately the credibility of controlling families. In
fact, the significant increases in return variance, trading volume, and bid-ask spread in family
restatement firms are still observable 120 days after the restatement announcements; but these
effects of restatements disappear for nonfamily restatement firms during the same period.
Moreover, an examination of the ERC indicates that, after restatement announcements,
investors perceive accounting earnings of family firms to be less informative than those of
nonfamily firms.
Our findings have two important implications. At the firm level, this study suggests that
family-controlled firms should promote a high quality of financial reporting practice with
greater efforts than nonfamily-controlled firms, in order to avoid the severe penalties imposed
by the market. At the policy level, to maximize the benefits of accounting information in
reducing market frictions and in facilitating the development of a resilient stock market,
regulators should take measures to encourage the adoption of credible reporting by all listed
firms, as well as enhancing the market perception of the trustworthiness of corporate insiders
by, for example, strengthening investor protection.
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Appendix A: Descriptions of key variables
Variable
Dependent variables
Misstate
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)
Abnormal return variance (ARV)
Abnormal trading volume (ATV)
Abnormal bid-ask spread (ABAS)
Key independent variables
Family
Post
Ownership wedge
Corporate opacity
Firm characteristics
Firm size
Leverage
ROA
Top share
Outside directors
Big auditor
MAO
Negative EPS
Reform
Audit committee
AF Background

Description
Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm misstates its annual financial report in a given period (and therefore has to restate the
financial report in a later period); zero for control firms
Equals the sum of the daily abnormal returns over the event window, where daily abnormal returns are calculated using the
market-adjusted model.
Equals the average of the squared market-model-adjusted daily return over the event window scaled by the stock return variance
over the estimate window [-120, -21].
Equals the average of the daily trading volume over the event window scaled by the average daily trading volume over the
estimate window [-120, -21].
Equals the average of the hourly relative spread (i.e., absolute spread divided by the average of bid and ask) over the event
window scaled by the average of the hourly relative spread over the estimate window [-120, -21].
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the ultimate largest shareholder in a firm is a family (all family member ownership combined);
zero otherwise
Dummy variable indicating post-restatement period
The difference between control rights and cash flow rights of the ultimate largest shareholder
An index that ranks four components, trading volume, analyst coverage, zero-return trading days, and stock return volatility in
deciles and divides the sum of the four components by 40, resulting in an opacity index between 0 and 1. A higher value of opacity
index indicates that a firm’s information is more opaque.
Natural log of total assets
Total liabilities / total assets
Net income / total assets
The proportion of equity ownership by the largest shareholder
Number of independent directors / total number of directors
Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm’s annual report is audited by one of the largest 10 auditing firms in China; zero otherwise
Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm receives a modified (qualified) audit opinion on its annual report; zero otherwise
Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has a negative EPS (earnings per share); zero otherwise
Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has completed the nontradable share reform; zero otherwise
Dummy variable that equals 1 if there exists an audit committee within the firm
The ratio of board members who have either accounting or financial background
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Appendix B Examples of accounting errors and irregularities
This list is not meant to be an exhaustive list of all types of accounting errors and irregularities that have occurred in China. Rather, the examples listed here
indicate how we classify various accounting restatements into accounting errors and irregularities.
Panel A: Examples of accounting errors
Stock code

Announcement date
(YYYY/MM/DD)

000062

2010/04/09

000150

2009/04/30

000662
000683

2009/04/11
2009/04/10

000939

2009/05/16

002081

2008/03/31

002139

2008/03/29

600331

2006/03/22

600366

2007/05/15

600481

2006/04/11

Reasons for restatement / before restatement
A joint-partner company was mistakenly shown in the annual report as
a subsidiary
This company would purchase Mr. Wang’s 4% ownership in this
company for a price of ‘7,200,574.25 wan yuan’
The number of shareholders was 22,917
Discrepancies between figures in Cash Flow Statement and those in
Notes to the Statement. The figures in the Statement were incorrect
1) owners’ equity was shown in the annual report as 36884 wan yuan;
2) the figures in page 58 of the annual report were in the unit of yuan;
3) an nonexistent related party transaction was mistakenly shown in
the report
In the list of top 10 unrestricted largest shareholders, the names of the
number 9 and 10 shareholders were incorrect
In Note 11 to the financial report, next to the compensation of three
directors, there was a remark which said “independent direct
allowance”
Due to miscalculation, the increase in fixed assets was reported as
752,018,731 yuan and accumulated depreciation was reported as
96,518,807 yuan
The term of an independent director, Mr. Qian Weishen, expired on
2009/04/27
1) Total compensation of directors, supervisors, and senior executives
was 186 wan yuan; 2) total amount of related party transections with
controlling shareholders and subsidiaries was 382 yuan

Actions taken / after restatement
The restatement corrected this mistake
…for a price of ‘7,200,574.25 yuan’
The number was changed to 31,891
Cash inflows in relation to operations was changed from
1,121,868,936 yuan to 721,868,936 yuan; Cash outflows
in relation to operations was changed from 888,410,372
yuan to 488,410,372 yuan
1) Owners’ equity was changed to 36848 wan yuan; 2)
those figures were changed to in the unit of wan yuan; 3)
this transaction was removed
The restatement corrected this mistake
The restatement removed this remark.
The restatement changed these two figures
756,677,479 yuan and 96,883,862 yuan, respectively.

to

…expired on 2007/04/25
After correction, total compensation was 206 wan yuan;
total related party transactions were 382 wan yuan
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Panel B: Examples of accounting irregularities
Stock code

Announcement date
(YYYY/MM/DD)

000078

2009/04/27

000509

2006/03/18

000558

2006/02/16

000760
000998

2007/03/22
2009/06/29

600311

2006/04/26

600711

2004/02/14

600840
600873

2005/03/12
2009/10/27

Reasons for restatement / before restatement
An sale of assets was not completed but income had been
recorded in the financial report
1) Incomes in previous years were artificially inflated; 2) bad
debt reserves were underestimated
Tax payable and tax expense in one subsidiary was
underestimated
Some expenses were not reported
Gain from the sale of part equity was recorded as the profit
in 2008. However, the regulator required it not be
recognised as profit
1) Some Short-term bank loans were not reported; 2)
associated financial expenses were not recognised
1) Incorrectly treated long-term equity investment; 2) did not
disclose loan guarantee provided for its whole owned
subsidiaries
Accrual of tax payable was underestimated
An ongoing litigation, which if won could potentially have
positive impact on earnings, is unlikely to have the expected
outcome because the defendant had gone missing

Actions taken / after restatement
Net profit and equity were reduced by 18,650,860 yuan
Retained earnings was reduced by 54,900,261 yuan
Profit and retained earnings were reduced by 1,145,010 yuan
Retained earnings in 2005 was reduced by 4,225,726 yuan
Total assets in 2008 was reduced by 24,924,930 yuan; net profit was
reduced by 24,844,394 yuan; EPS was reduced by 0.083 yuan
1) Short-term loans were increased by 70,000,000 yuan; 2) financial
expenses were increased by 3,596,647 yuan; 3)net profit was
reduced by 12,004,613 yuan
1) Long-term equity investment was reduced by 2,309,763 yuan; 2)
disclosed that the listed company had provided loan guarantee of
48,5000,000 yuan
Retained earnings was reduced by 3,275,563 yuan
Retained earnings and owners’ equity in 2007 and 2008 were
reduced by 1,860,354 yuan and 2,547,106 yuan, respectively
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